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The ADA: One Avenue to Appointed Counsel 
Before a Full Civil Gideon  
Lisa Brodoff, Susan McClellan & Elizabeth Anderson1 
 
The United States is witnessing a growing advocacy for universal “civil 
Gideon,”2 the constitutional right to free legal counsel for low-income 
people involved in civil litigation.3  The right to counsel has long been 
recognized in the criminal context in this country.4  In the civil arena, 
however, those who cannot afford to hire attorneys are left to fight to 
protect their rights on their own, sometimes against legally represented 
federal, state, and local governments attempting to take away their homes, 
assets, income, children, or health care.5  
This fight for a broad-based right to counsel in the civil arena will likely 
be long and hard, with success far from guaranteed.  In recent decisions on 
both coasts, courts have avoided reaching the civil Gideon issue.  For 
example, the Maryland Court of Appeals, the state’s highest court, when 
given the opportunity to decide whether its state constitution supports 
providing attorneys to indigent civil litigants, instead ruled on the 
underlying claim.6  In Washington State, a brain-injured litigant directly 
raised the issue of a civil right to counsel when the government sues 
individuals, but the Court of Appeals found the case moot because the low-
income defendant died while the case was on appeal.7  These cases indicate 
that the courts, at least in the short term, may be reluctant even to reach the 
merits of the civil Gideon issue, let alone find a sweeping right to free 
representation. 
In the meantime, low-income clients, unable to afford representation or 
to find free legal assistance that they desperately need to protect their rights, 
are going to state and federal courts and administrative hearings on their 
own.  These clients are being evicted, having their homes foreclosed, and 
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losing health care and public assistance.  Until the larger battle for free civil 
representation is fought and won, the legal community must seek other 
remedies for low-income clients that, although not sweeping in nature, may 
provide relief for at least the most vulnerable and those least able to 
represent themselves. 
Who are the litigants least able to represent themselves in court, who 
would be denied access to our system of justice unless provided with an 
attorney to advocate for them?  Are there litigants who, once inside the 
courtroom, simply cannot understand what is happening or cannot 
meaningfully participate in the proceedings, not because they lack 
education or experience, but because mental or physical disabilities impair 
their understanding?  Any attorney who has represented disabled clients in 
court, or any judge who has seen litigants with these disabilities attempt to 
put on a case or defense, knows that the answer to this question is 
frequently a resounding “yes.” 
Certain mental disabilities prevent a person from comprehending what is 
happening in the courtroom or mustering a case.  Some examples come 
readily to mind: mental retardation, dementia, schizophrenia, and severe 
depression.8  Similarly, certain physical disabilities sap energy or vitality to 
the extent that a person is unable to participate meaningfully in court.  
Some individuals with brain injuries, terminal illnesses, Parkinson’s 
disease, multiple sclerosis, AIDS,9 apraxia,10 and end-stage alcoholism11 
may qualify.  Simply put, clients with these disabling conditions may be 
denied access to our justice system without legal representation. 
Most people easily understand why clients with physical disabilities, 
such as blindness or hearing loss, need accommodations to get in the 
courthouse door and to participate meaningfully in the justice system.  For 
instance, some deaf individuals are denied access to justice through denial 
of a sign-language interpreter in the courtroom.12  Only an interpreter can 
translate the conversation in the proceeding and allow the hearing-impaired 
person to have her voice heard.  Similarly, a person with impaired vision 
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may be unable to read critical court documents and exhibits without 
accommodations such as Brailled materials, large-printed court documents, 
or human readers.13  Without these accommodations, including human 
accommodations like readers and interpreters, civil litigants with these 
disabling conditions would lose their day in court because they would not 
be able to communicate with the court or to understand fully the case and 
its consequences. 
The Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA)14 is the central law 
recognizing this reality for those with such disabilities.15  Complementing 
the ADA and its predecessor, the federal Rehabilitation Act,16 some state 
anti-discrimination statutes17 provide enhanced protections for individuals 
with disabilities in the court system.18  These state and federal laws require 
that sign-language interpreters, readers, large print documents, widened 
doorways, and wheelchair ramps be provided to people with disabilities 
whose access to the system would otherwise be blocked.  
In this article, we argue that people whose disabilities prevent them from 
understanding the proceedings or vigorously participating in their cases 
need accommodations to access the court system, just as do those with 
disabilities that require ramps, interpreters, and readers.  We argue that the 
only reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA, under the 
Rehabilitation Act, and under state anti-discrimination statutes for litigants 
with these disabling conditions is an attorney.  Only an attorney can provide 
the knowledge, energy, strategy, translation, and understanding to mount a 
case or provide a defense for those whose disabilities block their ability to 
do so pro se. 
Using the ADA to argue for free legal representation as a courthouse 
accommodation for certain disabled individuals is both more restrictive and 
yet broader than arguing for a full civil Gideon.  By definition, ADA 
accommodations are available only to persons with perceived or actual 
disabilities that affect their ability to participate in the judicial system.  
Arguments for a civil Gideon right to counsel for civil litigants does not 
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restrict that right only to disabled individuals.  Rather, a full civil Gideon 
would provide counsel to all litigants who are unable to afford their own 
attorney, regardless of disability.  On the other hand, the ADA affords a 
broader remedy because its provisions are not “needs based”; that is, ADA 
accommodations are available to rich and poor alike, and are not restricted 
by a litigant’s ability to pay for an attorney accommodation.19  No financial 
application is required to receive an ADA accommodation. 
The likely reality, however, is that those disabled individuals who need 
legal representation to defend or to pursue a claim, and who have the 
financial means to hire private counsel of their own choice will do so, even 
if, theoretically, they may be provided an attorney as a reasonable 
accommodation by the courts free of charge.  Finally, individuals with 
disabilities are by and large more likely to be poorer than the population as 
a whole.20  Thus, the impact of providing legal representation as an 
accommodation will most likely benefit those who are financially most in 
need.21  As a result, we argue that all civil litigants with disabilities that 
prevent them from understanding or participating in the legal system should 
receive appointed counsel. 
The first section of this article discusses the basic arguments and 
procedures for proving a disability under the ADA and seeking legal 
representation as a reasonable accommodation for clients in courts.  The 
second section addresses representation for clients in administrative 
hearings.  In administrative hearings, clients with disabilities are most often 
left to fight alone for rights to food (such as Food Stamps), income (such as 
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, General Assistance, 
Supplemental Security Income, and Social Security), and health care (such 
as Medicare and Medicaid).  The third section discusses additional policy 
arguments supporting the case for legal representation under anti-
discrimination laws.  The final section suggests ways to present these 
arguments to courts so that eligible litigants can access free legal 
representation in appropriate cases. 
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I. COURTS VIOLATE THE ADA BY DENYING APPOINTED COUNSEL AS 
A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR CERTAIN DISABLED CIVIL 
LITIGANTS.   
More than 49.7 million Americans, roughly one in five of the 257.2 
million people in the United States age five or older, have mental or 
physical disabilities or other long-lasting impairments.22  Before the 
enactment of the ADA, Congress recognized that current laws were 
“‘inadequate’ to combat the ‘pervasive problems of discrimination that 
people with disabilities are facing.’”23  As a result of this discrimination, 
Congress enacted the ADA in 1990, seeking to “provide a clear and 
comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination 
against individuals with disabilities.”24 
Title I of the ADA addresses discrimination in employment and applies 
to “persons engaged in an industry affecting commerce” who have at least 
fifteen employees (the United States and bona fide private membership 
clubs other than labor unions are exempt).25  Title II addresses 
discrimination in public services and applies to state and local governments, 
their departments, agencies, and other instrumentalities.26  In fact, Title II 
covers all public agencies, regardless of whether they receive federal 
financial assistance.27  Title III of the ADA addresses discrimination in 
places of public accommodation and services operated by private entities.28  
Businesses governed by Title III include banks, restaurants, supermarkets, 
hotels, shopping centers, privately owned sports arenas, movie theaters, 
private day-care centers, schools and colleges, accounting or insurance 
offices, lawyers’ and doctors’ offices, museums, and health clubs.29  Title 
IV of the ADA addresses telecommunications, including closed captioning 
and relay services for people with hearing impairments.30   
Denying appointed counsel for certain disabled civil litigants violates 
Title II, the Public Services section, of the ADA.31  Title II prohibits 
discrimination against disabled individuals in public services.32  
Specifically, Title II provides that, “no qualified individual with a disability 
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shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be 
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public 
entity,33 or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.”34  State 
courts, as public entities, must comply with Title II of the ADA35 by 
ensuring that all of their services, programs, and activities are available to 
qualified individuals with disabilities.  Federal courts must meet the same 
standard under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.36  In fact, Title II of 
the ADA was “expressly modeled after”37 sec. 504 of the Rehabilitation Act 
of 197338 and extends those principles to state and local governments.39  
Failing to make state court facilities available to disabled individuals 
violates the ADA, while failing to make federal court facilities available 
violates the Rehabilitation Act.40 
The critical importance of the ADA in providing individuals with 
disabilities access to the justice system is clearly illustrated by the facts and 
legal arguments in Tennessee v. Lane,41 which is currently awaiting a 
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court.  The State of Tennessee charged 
George Lane, a paraplegic who requires a wheelchair to ambulate, with two 
criminal misdemeanors and summoned him to court to appear and answer 
the charges. 
When George Lane showed up at the Polk County Courthouse 
with a crushed hip and pelvis, he had a problem.  His hearing was 
on the second floor, there was no elevator, and the judge said he 
had better get upstairs.  Mr. Lane, both of whose legs were in 
casts, somehow managed to get out of his wheelchair and crawl up 
two flights of stairs.  “On a pain scale of 1 to 10, it was way past 
10,” he says.   
While Mr. Lane crawled up, he says, the judge and other 
courthouse employees “stood at the top of the stairs and laughed at 
me.”  His case was not heard in the morning session, he says, and 
at the lunch break he crawled back down.  That afternoon, when he 
refused to crawl upstairs again, he was arrested for failing to 
appear, and put in jail.42   
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Mr. Lane and another plaintiff, a wheel-chair bound court reporter who 
could not work in many Tennessee courtrooms because they were 
inaccessible, sued the state on behalf of a class of physically disabled 
persons.  They argued for injunctive relief and damages under Title II of the 
ADA.  The State argued that Eleventh Amendment immunity applies, 
thereby protecting the State from private suits for money damages.  The 
Sixth Circuit held that the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states to 
private damages suits did not apply to claims under Title II of the ADA, 
when the claim involved the Due Process Clause. 
Parties in civil litigation have an analogous due process right to be 
present in the courtroom and to meaningfully participate in the 
process unless their exclusion furthers important governmental 
interests. . . .  These guarantees are protective of equal justice and 
fair treatment before the courts.  The evidence before Congress 
when it enacted Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act 
established that physical barriers in government buildings, 
including courthouses and in the courtrooms themselves, have had 
the effect of denying disabled people the opportunity to access 
vital services and to exercise fundamental rights guaranteed by the 
Due Process Clause.43   
In this article, we argue that the denial of equal justice and fair treatment 
before the courts applies with equal vigor when a person’s mental or 
physical disabilities prevent him not from mounting the stairs to the 
courtroom, but from mounting the case itself.  Here, the appropriate and 
reasonable accommodation is attorney representation rather than elevator 
access to the court proceedings. 
The failure to make court facilities available to disabled individuals also 
violates the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD).44  
Generally, WLAD bans discrimination on the basis of “any sensory, mental, 
or physical disability.”45  Further, the WLAD makes the right to be free 
from discrimination a civil right46 and protects “the right to the full 
enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or 
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privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or 
amusement.”47  The ADA provides guidance for interpreting a public 
entity’s obligations under WLAD.48 
To prove that a public program or service violates the ADA, a litigant 
need only show that (1) she is a “qualified individual with a disability”; (2) 
she “was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of a 
public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise 
discriminated against by the public entity”; and (3) “such exclusion, denial 
of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his [or her] disability.”49  
After a litigant establishes discrimination by a public entity under Title II, 
the court must determine the appropriate remedy.50  
The ADA provides three ways to prove that a litigant is a “qualified 
individual with a disability.”  A “person with a disability” is defined as 
someone who has “(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially 
limits one or more of the major life activities of such individual; (B) a 
record of such an impairment; or (C) being regarded as having such an 
impairment.”51 
Once a litigant proves a disability, she must prove that the disability 
excluded her from participating in or denied her the benefits of the court’s 
services, programs, or activities.  The regulations require that these services, 
“when viewed in [their] entirety,” be readily accessible to and usable by 
individuals with disabilities.52  Exceptions exist only when compliance 
results in “undue financial or administrative burdens” or results in a 
“fundamental alteration” in the program.53  The public entity must also 
provide notice to individuals with disabilities of the “protections against 
discrimination assured them” and “disseminate sufficient information” to 
those individuals “to inform them of the rights and protections afforded by 
the ADA.”54  Altogether, “the program access requirement of Title II should 
enable individuals with disabilities to participate in and benefit from the 
services, programs, or activities of public entities in all but the most unusual 
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cases.”55  Trial courts, as services within the meaning of Title II,56 must 
provide these protections.  
The third step in establishing disability discrimination under Title II 
requires showing that such exclusion or denial of a service or benefit was 
by reason of an individual’s disability.57  Courts fail to make their services 
accessible to litigants who are not able to use the system effectively because 
of mental or physical impairments.  Meaningful access does not exist when 
a litigant’s inability to understand or to participate in proceedings because 
of a disability surpasses the mere confusion many lay persons experience 
when participating in the legal system.  As the Honorable Robert W. Sweet, 
in proposing full civil Gideon, has noted:  
As every trial judge knows, the task of determining the correct 
legal outcome is rendered almost impossible without effective 
counsel.  Courts have neither the time nor the capacity to be both 
litigants and impartial judges on any issue of genuine complexity.  
As recognized by the Lassiter dissent, “By intimidation, 
inarticulateness or confusion, a [litigant] can lose forever” the right 
she sought to protect.58   
When confusion stems from a disability, Judge Sweet’s admonition 
carries even more force.  A disabled litigant may be physically present in 
the courtroom but have little understanding of the law and proceedings and 
little ability to advocate for her rights.  A factual showing that a litigant 
does not understand proceedings and cannot meaningfully participate 
because of a disability compels the court to consider providing reasonable 
accommodations.59  A public entity, including a court, must reasonably 
accommodate a qualified individual with a disability.60  Mere equality of 
treatment is insufficient.61  
Upon receiving a request for an accommodation, a public entity’s duty is 
well settled by state and federal case law and by the applicable 
regulations.62 First, the public entity must undertake a fact-specific 
investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation 
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and must provide the criteria by which to determine whether the evaluation 
is adequate.63  The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act attempt to provide 
whatever services or actions are necessary to ensure that disabled persons 
are not discriminated against as a result of their disabilities.  One court 
noted, “mere speculation that a suggested accommodation is not feasible 
falls short of the reasonable accommodation requirement; the Acts create a 
duty to gather sufficient information from the disabled individual and 
qualified experts as needed to determine what accommodations [are] 
necessary.”64 
Necessary accommodations include effective courtroom commun-
ications: “a public entity shall take appropriate steps to ensure that 
communications with applicants, participants, and members of the public 
with disabilities are as effective as communications with others.”65 
Appointment of counsel, which would allow the individual with a disability 
to communicate with the court, could qualify as a reasonable 
accommodation because it is similar to the following sample aids and 
services provided in the regulations:  
1. Qualified interpreters, note takers, transcription services, 
written materials, telephone handset amplifiers, assistive 
listening devices, assistive listening systems, telephones 
compatible with hearing aids, closed caption decoders, 
open and closed captioning, telecommunications devices 
for deaf persons (TDD’s), videotext displays, or other 
effective methods of making aurally delivered materials 
available to individuals with hearing impairments [for 
example, talking calculators and real time transcription];  
2. Qualified readers, taped texts, audio recordings, Brailled 
materials, large print materials, or other effective methods 
of making visually delivered materials available to 
individuals with visual impairments;   
3. Acquisition or modification of equipment or devices; and 
other similar services or actions.66 
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This extensive list and the final, separate category for “other similar 
services or actions” suggest a broadly-based evaluation of appropriate 
auxiliary aids and services.  These services include the assistance of trained 
individuals, such as sign-language interpreters for the deaf and readers for 
the blind.  Appointed counsel for some litigants with certain disabilities 
would serve the same interpretive function and would allow the litigants to 
participate in the proceedings. 
Appointed counsel would not be necessary for all litigants who suffer 
from certain disabilities.  The degree of impairment matters, as does the 
specific setting and alternative accommodations available.  For this reason, 
the ADA does not prescribe the appropriate accommodation for each 
disability because an appropriate accommodation for one person might be 
inappropriate for another.  For example, while one visually-impaired person 
might need a reader, another might need materials in Braille.67  The public 
entity, however, must consider available options and furnish “appropriate 
auxiliary aids and services where necessary.”68  In determining the 
appropriate aid or service, the public entity shall give “primary 
consideration” to the requests of the individual with disabilities.69 
Accordingly, a court cannot offer a blanket accommodation for all 
individuals with a specific disability; it must consider the particular 
individual’s need when determining which accommodations are 
reasonable.70    
For some litigants with disabilities—those who cannot understand or 
participate in the legal proceedings—interpreters are the only appropriate 
accommodation.  Other options would not ensure that a court’s 
communications with such individuals are “as effective as communications 
with others,”71 as required by law.72  For example, although one 
commentator has suggested that the best current option for providing legal 
assistance for the poor lies in improving pro se assistance projects,73 that 
proposal would provide no benefit to litigants whose disabilities impair 
their ability to understand or to partake in the legal process.  Similarly, 
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simplifying the legal process by redrafting forms and restructuring 
procedures would not help litigants with such disabilities, even though 
simplification might help some indigent civil litigants.74  Even if individuals 
with such disabilities could understand simplified forms, they are unlikely 
to understand the underlying legal issues.  Furthermore, if individuals’ 
disabilities weaken them to the extent they cannot participate in the process, 
a simplified procedure would still preclude meaningful access to the courts. 
Arguments that the cost of appointed counsel renders the accommodation 
unreasonable lack merit.  Providing an attorney for litigants with these 
disabilities is not only appropriate but also reasonable in terms of cost,75 
and would neither create an “undue burden” for the courts nor 
“fundamentally alter” the nature of the court system.76  “Title II ensures that 
the refusal to accommodate an individual with a disability is genuinely 
based on unreasonable cost or actual inability to accommodate, not on 
inconvenience or unfounded concerns about costs.”77  In addressing the cost 
issue in the employment context under Title I of the Rehabilitation Act,78 
courts have focused on the big picture, namely the overall costs to society 
stemming from lack of funding, rather than simply the dollars required to 
pay for legal services.79  For example, in Nelson v. Thornburgh, the Third 
Circuit concluded that a large state agency was required to accommodate a 
group of entry-level welfare agency workers with visual impairments by 
providing readers for one-half of the working day and emergency access to 
a reader the remainder of the day.80  The court reasoned that “when one 
considers the social costs which would flow from the exclusion of persons 
such as the plaintiffs from the pursuit of their profession, the modest cost of 
accommodation—a cost which seems likely to diminish, as technology 
advances and proliferates—seems, by comparison, quite small.”81  While 
providing specialists to assist disabled litigants might be an undue hardship 
for some small agencies or businesses, providing them for large businesses 
or agencies is reasonable.82   
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Other considerations also indicate that providing attorneys for litigants 
with certain disabling conditions would not bankrupt the system.  First, the 
number of litigants with such disabilities is relatively small compared to the 
pool of indigent civil litigants.  Commentators argue that costs, even for full 
civil Gideon, are not unduly burdensome and that, in fact, some resources 
will be conserved.83  For example, Justice Earl Johnson notes that other 
countries have provided free counsel as a matter of right in civil cases, as 
have several pre-paid legal insurance programs in this country.84  Bidran 
and Ben-Cohen argue that providing counsel for indigent civil defendants 
would save society money in the long run85 by reducing litigation and 
eliminating the delays prevalent in pro se representation.86  This prediction 
is consistent with a study finding that funding legal services programs saves 
significant state funds.87  Finally, additional societal benefits, perhaps worth 
more than the cost, could accrue, with the primary benefit being restored 
confidence in the justice system.88 
II.  REPRESENTATION FOR APPELLANTS IN ADMINISTRATIVE 
HEARINGS     
The arguments under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act for legal 
representation as a reasonable accommodation apply, in almost the same 
manner, to the administrative hearing context.  People with disabilities are 
regularly appellants in administrative hearings, appealing a state or federal 
agency’s denial, reduction, or termination of critical public assistance 
benefits involving access to food, shelter, income, and health care.  Appeals 
of benefits like Unemployment Compensation, Worker’s Compensation, 
Food Stamps, Social Security, Supplemental Security Income (SSI), 
General Assistance, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), 
Medicaid, and Medicare often involve disabled individuals because 
disability is frequently a prerequisite to eligibility for these benefits.89  The 
law in these areas can be complex, involving federal and state statutes and 
regulations and cases interpreting them.  In addition, these hearings can be 
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factually complicated, requiring appellants to put on evidence of their 
disabilities, work records, medical records, and finances.  In most instances, 
appellants with disabilities appear pro se at their administrative hearings to 
fight for these significant benefits.90 
Appellants navigating the hearings process whose disabilities prevent 
them from understanding the proceedings or putting on a case would greatly 
benefit from the ADA and Rehabilitation Act arguments.  State agencies 
that hold administrative hearings are, by definition, “public entities” under 
the ADA, as are federal agencies under the Rehabilitation Act.91  Like state 
and federal courts, executive branch agencies are required by law to include 
qualified individuals with disabilities in the provision of all services.92  
Courts have applied the Acts to the accessibility of public meetings,93 
community mental health board of trustee meetings,94 and access to the 
child welfare system.95  Surely, if accommodations are required in these 
settings, they are also required in all administrative hearings.96   
In fact, the Washington State Office of Administrative Hearings 
(OAH)—the state agency responsible for conducting hearings for the state 
Department of Social and Health Services (DSHS),97  the Employment 
Security Department, and the Office of Superintendent of Public Instruction 
(for special education benefits hearings), among forty others—tells public 
assistance appellants in the “Hearing Rights” pamphlet it sends with every 
Notice of Hearing that it is subject to the ADA and Rehabilitation Act and 
will provide reasonable accommodations for disabled litigants to access the 
hearing system.98 
In the administrative hearings situation, reasonable accommodation 
might require attorneys for the hearings of some agencies, but not others.  
Unlike the state and federal courts, the administrative hearing setting does 
not always require that a legal representative be a licensed attorney.99  For 
example, in Washington State, OAH hearings on behalf of DSHS and 
Employment Security allow representatives who are not licensed attorneys 
to represent appellants.100  For those hearings, arguably, a trained lay 
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representative, law student, or paralegal, rather than a lawyer, would be a 
reasonable accommodation.  In those state101 and federal102 hearings where 
only lawyers can act as representatives, however, the only allowable 
accommodation is to provide attorney representation. 
Legal representation seems critical for public benefits hearings in 
particular because they involve access to critical “brutal needs”103 
assistance for low-income and disabled litigants, and the law is particularly 
complex and difficult to parse.  Moreover, because low-income people who 
rely on public benefits to meet basic needs lack the resources to hire 
lawyers to take their appeals to the court system, the administrative hearing 
process is likely the only justice system available to them.  Without legal 
representation at the hearing, appellants with disabilities that prevent them 
from making cogent legal arguments will likely lose.104  Using the ADA to 
get representation for these clients as a reasonable accommodation could be 
the difference between hunger and adequate nutrition, illness and health 
care, or homelessness and shelter. 
III.  POLICY ARGUMENTS DEMONSTRATING THE REASONABLENESS 
OF APPOINTED COUNSEL 
Several policy concerns, both national and international, support 
appointing counsel for certain individuals with disabilities who are involved 
in judicial or administrative proceedings.  Moreover, arguments supporting 
counsel for indigent civil litigants apply with even greater vigor to the 
plight of civil litigants with certain disabilities.  These arguments are based 
on the historical development of the right to appointed counsel in both 
criminal and civil contexts in the United States; the disparity between the 
protections afforded to civil litigants by all other major Western nations and 
the utter lack of systemic protections for civil litigants in the United States; 
and notions of fundamental fairness, both actual and perceived.105 
Civil litigants who are disabled to such an extent that they cannot 
comprehend or participate in court proceedings have a greater need for 
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counsel than other civil litigants, yet courts in the United States have been 
reluctant to recognize this need.  This reluctance follows a pattern of 
incremental recognition of the right to counsel in both the criminal and civil 
contexts.  Even though the Sixth Amendment unequivocally guarantees the 
right to counsel for criminal defendants, only those defendants charged with 
capital offenses enjoyed the right prior to the 1930’s.106  From the 1930’s 
through the 1960’s, the Supreme Court expanded coverage, first by 
recognizing the right to counsel for all federal defendants, then by 
extending the right to defendants in state courts in specific situations.107 
Appointment of counsel in civil matters, though lagging behind 
appointment of counsel for criminal defendants, is not a new concept in the 
United States.  In 1948, Congress granted the federal courts statutory 
authority to appoint counsel for indigent civil litigants.108  The Third Circuit 
Court of Appeals interpreted 28 U.S.C. § 1915 as affording district courts 
“broad discretion” to determine whether appointment of counsel in a civil 
case would be appropriate.109  The Third Circuit rejected several courts’ 
interpretations that appointment of counsel in civil cases should be granted 
only under “exceptional circumstances.”110  Yet even under the exceptional 
circumstances analysis, courts have found that, in the balance of factors, the 
standard was met to allow appointment of counsel.  For example, the Fourth 
Circuit found exceptional circumstances existed where the plaintiff lacked 
education in legal matters, his incarceration status prevented contact with 
witnesses, the testimony was conflicting, and the plaintiff lacked training in 
cross-examination.111  
In determining whether a district court should order appointment of 
counsel, the Third Circuit articulated a number of factors to consider, 
without reference to the stringent exceptional circumstances standard.112  
The threshold consideration here is whether the plaintiff’s claims have 
“arguable merit in fact and law.”113  If the court determines a claim has 
sufficient merit, then it must consider factors regarding the plaintiff’s ability 
to present her case, such as “education, literacy, prior work experience, and 
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prior litigation experience.”114  The court should also weigh the 
complexities of the legal issues and the need for factual investigation.115  
The appointment of counsel may be appropriate when the likelihood exists 
that extensive discovery or expert testimony will be required, or that 
credibility determinations will play a significant role in the trial. 
The Third Circuit’s test, known as the Tabron test, has been adopted by 
one court in a Title II ADA action.116  While the court ultimately held that 
the plaintiff was not entitled to appointment of counsel, the court found her 
claim sufficiently meritorious to warrant consideration of the additional 
factors relevant to the appointment of counsel.117  In weighing the factors, 
the court determined that the plaintiff had, at a minimum, a college 
education; she presumably had access to public law libraries where she 
could conduct any necessary research; expert testimony was unlikely to be 
required; and the case did not present unusually complex legal issues.118  
These factors weighed against the appointment of counsel in that case.  The 
door was left open, however, for the appointment of counsel in civil matters 
with more compelling circumstances.  Arguments for appointed counsel 
may prevail, for example, when expert testimony is required, the case 
presents unusually complex issues, and the plaintiff does not have a college 
education and has a mental disability that prevents her from comprehending 
complex matters in the courtroom.  When some of these circumstances 
exist, plaintiffs should request the assistance of counsel. 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964119 also permits courts to appoint 
counsel for the plaintiff on request in an employment discrimination suit.120  
In making the determination, courts consider three factors: the financial 
resources of the plaintiff, efforts made to secure counsel, and the merit of 
the plaintiff’s claim.121  Commentators have noted a key conundrum 
inherent in the test: the problem of determining the merits of a case before 
the case has been presented, especially without counsel to assess and 
present the merits.122  This problem is compounded when a litigant has a 
disability that prevents or impairs understanding and participating in court 
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proceedings.  This additional consideration might assist a plaintiff with such 
a disability in obtaining counsel in employment discrimination cases. 
This individualized, piecemeal approach to achieving the right to counsel 
for civil litigants with certain disabilities will likely parallel the same slow, 
incremental advancements that have marked the development of the right 
for both criminal and civil litigants in this country.  While the United States 
struggles for incremental advancements, many developed countries provide 
appointed counsel for indigent civil litigants,123 even if they are not 
disabled.  Courts in these countries ground their analyses in statutes, as in 
England;124 in constitutions, as in Switzerland; or in a combination of the 
two, as in Germany.125  Moreover, the European Convention of Human 
Rights “guarantees the right to counsel in civil cases, recognizing it as a 
fundamental right.”126 
Although United States courts and citizens have generally rejected any 
notion that our country is not the world leader in issues of justice,127 some 
justices are willing to consider approaches and reasoning of other 
nations.128  As Justice Earl Johnson noted, United States Supreme Court 
Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Sandra Day O’Connor, and Anthony 
Kennedy, while speaking at conferences, have all suggested that the Court 
is willing to consider jurisprudence from other nations.129  In fact, as Justice 
Johnson observed, Justice Kennedy, writing for a six-justice majority in 
Lawrence v. Texas,130 “relied heavily on foreign decisions.”131 
With so many countries recognizing that the right to counsel in civil 
cases is fundamental, courts in the United States should follow their lead 
and conclude, at the very least, that a disabled individual who cannot 
understand or participate in court proceedings is entitled to an attorney.  
While the average indigent civil litigant has some understanding of court 
processes and proceedings, the person with certain disabilities does not.  In 
this respect, the United States cannot continue to lag so far behind the other 
major Western nations of the world.132 
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Three additional notions of fairness, which commentators have noted for 
all civil litigants,133 apply with equal or greater force in the present context.  
First, in some contexts, civil litigants who may be more disadvantaged by 
lack of counsel than criminal litigants.134  For example, the loss of custody 
of a child or civil commitment as an incompetent, may, in the long run, be 
far more agonizing than incarceration for a short period of time.135  Second, 
where the state brings a suit against a disabled defendant to deprive access 
to food, shelter, children, or health care, the civil preponderance-of-the-
evidence standard is much easier to prove than the beyond-a-reasonable-
doubt standard for criminal cases.136  As a result, in a civil suit, the state 
could more easily prevail and deprive a person of critical benefits.  Finally, 
citizens lose faith in our justice system when it seems to be unfair.137  Few 
acts are more unfair than denying the appointment of counsel for a civil 
litigant whose disability prevents her from understanding or participating 
effectively in the proceedings. 
IV.  PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS IN OBTAINING ATTORNEY 
REPRESENTATION FOR DISABLED CLIENTS  
These ADA arguments may never be made for those most in need unless 
an organized approach to evaluating a litigant’s need for an accommodation 
and a referral system is in place to get representation for disabled clients.  
Yet, finding the litigants that need an attorney accommodation may be 
difficult because of the very nature of their disabilities.  Litigants whose 
disabilities cause them to be too confused or weak to forward their causes in 
court may also be unable to ask the court, effectively, for legal 
representation.  Furthermore, because of their disabling conditions, these 
litigants are also unlikely to be able to put forth the sophisticated legal 
arguments required to make the case for an attorney accommodation.  How, 
then, will these cases be brought to the attention of legal services providers 
who can then make these arguments on behalf of clients? 
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Advocates for the disabled should take a more proactive and organized 
approach in identifying these clients and providing this accommodation by 
meeting with court personnel, administrative agency management, and 
judges to discuss these issues.  Additionally, ADA coordinators in the 
courts and in administrative agencies should be assigned the task of 
evaluating the need for an attorney accommodation and creating an internal 
appeal process for challenging an accommodation denial in the same way 
other disability accommodations are evaluated and appealed. 
Judges and administrative hearing officers—the people who may be in 
the best position to initially identify whether a litigant needs an attorney 
accommodation—should be trained to identify and refer litigants to 
courthouse ADA coordinators for arranging representation.  Courts and 
administrative agencies must then develop contracts with legal services 
providers to supply legal representation in these cases. 
Before such a system is in place, non-profit legal services organizations 
may have to create a caller-screening system to identify clients to represent 
solely for the purpose of arguing for  attorney accommodation in their legal 
disputes.  Such screening systems are already being developed to find 
appropriate plaintiffs to bring litigation to establish a general civil 
Gideon.138  To make the argument for an attorney accommodation for 
disabled litigants who come to the attention of providers through a 
screening process, legal services organizations, advocacy groups for the 
elderly and disabled, or pro bono attorneys might have to make special 
appearances in identified cases, appearing for the sole purpose of arguing 
for an ADA accommodation. 
Making a limited appearance, however, has inherent dangers.  In a recent 
Maryland case, the argument that a free lawyer must be provided to all low-
income civil litigants under the Maryland Constitution was raised.  
Although the court did not reach the merits of the issue, it did comment that 
“Ms. Frase, as noted, is well represented by counsel in this appeal, and there 
is no assurance that, should any further litigation be brought by or against 
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Ms. Frase, she would not be represented in that litigation.”139  Further, the 
court noted that it would not make the assumption that the five attorneys 
and numerous pro bono organizations that specially appeared in the case to 
argue for civil Gideon would “then abandon her,” should she need further 
representation on the underlying merits of her case.140  Therefore, courts 
may, as did the Maryland Court of Appeals, ignore the special appearance 
and require that the attorney provide representation in the underlying case. 
Advocacy groups and justice systems must address these issues regarding 
client identification and referral so that those litigants who need 
representation are served.  No isolated group can address these issues 
effectively.  To solve these issues, courts, administrative agencies, non-
profit legal service organizations, bar associations, pro bono attorneys, and 
advocacy groups for the disabled must work together to obtain meaningful 
results. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
With full civil Gideon still on the distant horizon, advocates should use 
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act to argue that appointed counsel is 
necessary for civil litigants with certain disabilities.  Both state and federal 
courts are required to make their services equally accessible to those with 
disabilities.  Currently, neither courts nor administrative hearings are 
accessible for those whose disabilities impair their capacity either to 
understand or to partake in the proceedings.  Although alternative aids or 
services might be appropriate for some of these litigants, others will require 
attorney representation. 
Appointed counsel for these civil litigants is not only appropriate but also 
reasonable.  The number of these litigants is relatively small when 
compared to the total number of indigent civil litigants in the country.  The 
costs seem even smaller compared with the almost certain loss of crucial 
needs, such as food, housing, income benefits, and property if the litigant is 
without attorney representation.  Moreover, greater loss accrues from 
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citizens’ lost faith in the justice system.  With all the major European 
nations and the European Court of Human Rights granting free attorney 
representation in civil cases, the United States must be able to protect its 
most vulnerable civil litigants: those whose disabilities prevent them from 
understanding or fully participating in judicial and administrative 
proceedings. 
Advocates and the justice system, working together, can remedy this 
problem.  By focusing on the true meaning of the ADA’s requirement of 
reasonable accommodation, the bench and bar can devise methods for 
screening and evaluating clients, creating contracts in order to represent 
them, and devising systems for administering and evaluating the program.  
Only then will civil litigants with certain disabilities have real access to the 
justice system. 
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